Application of game theory for modeling information security problems
DOI: 10.31673/2412-4338.2022.011524
Abstract
There is a continuous development of information technologies in terms of diversity and level of their complexity, which is accompanied by an increase in requirements for information protection. With the development of scientific progress, attackers also improve their skills and knowledge causing more damage. Constant communication and increased availability of computing resources for attackers help them to carry out complex and distributed attacks at any moment of time. Since the beginning of the Internet, researchers have been studying the problem of cyber security. However, the problem is far from completely solved. Re-cently, game theory concepts have been applied to all levels of security, including cyberspace, often referred to as security games. Games involve the actions of two or more rational players who have a certain strategy and compete for a certain reward. Game theory secures escrow using quantitative security measures rather than the qualitative measures provided by cryptographic security. In addition, game-theoretic approaches can be extended to design mechanisms that allow system designers to shift balances and predict outcomes in favor of defenders using complex play designs.
Qualitative ways of overcoming traditional approaches to cyber security and privacy with game theory methods were described. In addition, in relation to cyber privacy, game theory has applications in information sharing, anonymity, privacy, and cryptography.
This article examines research on game theory and differential game theory in network security at the applied level. It has been observed that most research works applying game theory concepts are not network specific due to the complexity of cyberspace. So, we present the best research methods that can be used to achieve better results in the defense of cyberspace using game theory.
Keywords: game theory, information security problems, security games.
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